NAGISA TADJFAR
I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of British Columbia. I received my PhD in Economics from MIT in 2026.
I research topics in labor economics, with a focus on socioeconomic inequality. My work uses field experiments and administrative data to study barriers to opportunity in higher education and early-career labor markets.
Working Papers
Friends in Higher Places: Social Fit and University Choice
(with Kartik Vira)
Abstract
How does lack of social exposure to elite university students inhibit applications from talented low-SES high schoolers? We combine UK administrative data with a field experiment to show that perceptions of the social environment at elite universities are a central barrier. We exploit “breakthrough” events when a school first sends a student to a top university and find that applications and attendance to that university subsequently rise. Surveys show that low-SES students are pessimistic about their chances of fitting in socially at elite universities, but not their chances of receiving an offer. Random assignment to videos of undergraduates discussing their experiences and one-on-one mentorship increases applications to the treatment university by 14 percentage points. Student beliefs about their social fit at that university update positively, with no change in other beliefs.
Prediction or Prejudice? Standardized Testing and University Access
(with Kartik Vira)
Abstract
Do high-stakes standardized tests expand or inhibit opportunity for low-SES students? We answer this question in the context of the UK's staggered elimination of pre-university exams in favor of teachers' predicted exam grades. Eliminating testing increases the university enrollment of low-income students by 3 percentage points (7%), while leaving wealthy students' enrollment unchanged. Marginal students induced to enroll in university attain employment at better firms and, in expectation, earn £50,000—£100,000 more over their careers, in net present value. Paradoxically, standardized exams exhibit no calibration bias against marginal low-income students—accurately predicting their university success—whereas teacher-supplied grades are systematically biased in their favor. Despite proper calibration, standardized tests inhibit low-SES students by deterring human capital investment. When tests are eliminated, 5% of low-income students shift into academic tracks. These findings highlight how disparate impacts can arise even when screening algorithms are unbiased. When the measurement of information itself poses a direct disutility, standardized tests generate disparities that commence earlier in the pipeline.
The Winner’s Curse in Early Admissions
(with Phi Adajar and Kartik Vira)
Draft coming soon!
Abstract
Extending admission offers with incomplete information on students' ability can lead to negative consequences for universities in two ways: moral hazard, where students reduce academic effort in response to an early offer, and adverse selection, where students with low private signals self-select into early offers before the public signal is realized. We disentangle these mechanisms in the context of the UK's university admission system using the staggered roll-out of unconditional offers. Takers of these offers scored 0.14SD lower on age-18 exams than decliners conditional on observables, but this decrease in performance is driven entirely by adverse selection. We rule out a moral hazard share of up to one-third, indicating a high degree of private information. Using a structural model of admissions, we estimate that students privately know about two-thirds of the residual variance in their realized test scores. We use these estimates to quantify the distributional effects of unconditional offers and alternative systems, finding that welfare gains are concentrated among lower-achieving students, that continuing to allow unconditional offers at moderate, pre-ban intensities is close to welfare-neutral for the market as a whole, and that welfare is highest under a counterfactual system that delays admissions decisions until after final exam results are known. Although participating universities were worse off because enrolling cohorts had lower realized test scores, students benefited from a higher probability of university enrollment at age 18 and 2.4% higher earnings by age 26. Our findings highlight how incentives students face and their information structure have key impacts on the design of admissions systems.
Firms Believing Women Get Less Means They Do
(with Nancy Wang)
Abstract
This paper examines an employer-driven mechanism behind the early-career gender earnings gap using novel data on MIT graduates’ job offers and negotiation process. We document three key findings. First, women receive lower initial compensation offers than men within an employer-occupation. Second, this gap is entirely concentrated in non-salary components—signing bonus and equity—with no gap in base salary. Third, we find no gender differences in job search, and women negotiate as frequently and successfully as men. These findings also generalize to a national sample of high-skill workers in a dataset from Levels.fyi. To understand these patterns, we develop a model showing that a small number of discriminatory firms leads all firms in the market to lowball women in equilibrium. This market-wide gender gap is sustained through outside offers and cannot be closed by changes in worker behavior. We validate this mechanism using an incentivized resume evaluation experiment with recruiters, where we find that firms expect other firms to offer women less. Our results highlight the role of firm behavior—rather than worker decisions alone—in perpetuating gender pay disparities.Publications
Trade Competition and the Decline in Union Organizing: Evidence from Certification Elections
(with Kerwin K. Charles and Matthew S. Johnson). Journal of Labor Economics, 2026.